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Abstract 
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to assess the applicability of relational contract theory 
in situations where government departments contract with non-government welfare 
organisations to deliver human service programmes. Its limits are highlighted by an 
assessment of programmes for domestically violent men that epitomise “management of 
incomplete contracts” central to the theory. 
 
Design/methodology/approach – The paper is based on an evaluation of contracted-out 
programmes for perpetrators of domestic violence in Australia that set out to compare and 
contrast distinct models of service delivery by documenting programme logic, service 
delivery effectiveness and effects on programme participants. It reflects on the difficulties of 
monitoring such programmes and considers the implications of this for contracting theory and 
for human service practice. 
 
Findings – In contrast to critiques of contracting-out in a neo-liberal environment that 
emphasise how accountability and reporting requirements limit the autonomy of contracted 
agencies, this paper highlights considerable variation in how programmes were managed and 
delivered despite standardised service delivery contracts developed by the government 
department funding the programmes. This leads to a consideration of “incomplete contracts” 
where service delivery outcomes are hard to measure or there is limited knowledge of the 
contracted agencies by the contracting government department. 
 
Originality/value – The paper highlights a situation in which the recommendations of 
relational contracting theory can exacerbate the difficulties of quality assurance rather than 
minimise them. It then argues a need for workforce development in the government 
departments and the contracted agencies, to enable a nuanced monitoring of the programmes' 
service delivery and promotion of quality assurance processes. 
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violence; Contracting out; Public administration; Private companies; Social welfare; 
Australia; Service delivery. 
Introduction 
From the 1980s onwards, the contracting out or commissioning of human services delivery 
by government departments to non-government welfare organisations (NGOs), both not-for-
profit and for-profit, has been a common feature of social policy in many countries around 
the world. The rationale has been that state-run services are both inherently expensive and ill-
equipped to respond quickly to changing service user and service delivery needs, whereas 
contracting out introduces market efficiency and a greater degree of flexibility in how 
services are delivered. In addition, proponents argue that contracting out provides an 
opportunity for government departments to specify what should be delivered, thereby 
offering a high level of control over service delivery, without having to directly run the 
services. 
Some practice and service delivery consequences of programmes contracted out to NGOs are 
illustrated in this paper through a case study approach which describes a multi-site evaluation 
of programmes for perpetrators of domestic violence delivered in Australia. The programmes 
were being run by not-for-profit non-government welfare organisations, with the common 
intention of increasing women's and children's safety and reducing men's use of domestic 
violence. All of the organisations were subject to the same formal contract requirements but 
in this paper we document and discuss the variations in practice that were observed between 
the different providers, and the extent to which the programmes conformed to their self-
described models. Before doing so, a brief history of domestic violence perpetrator 
programmes, along with a discussion of contracting out in the human services in Australia, is 
presented to provide a context for the analysis. 
Contractualism 
Developments in human services delivery in Australia since the 1980s have been consistent 
with developments elsewhere in the western world. These include contracting out of service 
delivery through a purchasing model that relies on competitive tendering by NGOs[1], 
performance measurement based service agreements, and increasing specification by 
government about the nature, outcome and quality of the service to be delivered by funded 
organisations. As with international developments, increasing government regulation of 
outputs through stringent accountability and governance requirements has been intended to 
increase efficiency and productivity in the human services in Australia (Austin, 2003). 
Instead of focusing on resource development within the government departments, it was held 
to be preferable and/or more efficient to contract with NGOs that were already undertaking 
the various roles and responsibilities. 
Considerable research has focused on the capacity of service provider agencies to meet 
contractual requirements for reporting and accountability as well as actually delivering the 
services. A number of researchers in Australia, (Buchanan and Considine, 2002; Owen et al., 
2001; Spall and Zetlin, 2004; Yeatman and Penglase, 2004) and in the US and Canada (Light, 
2003; McMullen and Brisbois, 2003; Nittoli, 2003; O'Connor and Ilcan, 2005; Romzek and 
Johnston, 2005; Saunders and Brisbois, 2004) have identified a range of commonly reported 
challenges for service delivery as a result of these changes. In particular, the project-based, 
fixed-term funding arrangements typically associated with contracting out are seen to have 
resulted in increased use of short-term employment contracts by most NGOs, and there are 
arguments in the scholarly literature that this can seriously undermine the potential for 
capacity building in these agencies (Healy, 2004; Meagher and Healy, 2003; Wagner and 
Spence, 2003). 
A much less well-developed strand of research, however, concerns the capacity of 
commissioning departments to develop and manage contracts with agencies (Cooper, 2003; 
Fernandez, 2007). In practice, agreements between governments and NGOs appear to be 
associated with significant implementation problems, including: 
 an inability to define outcomes in contracts (Flynn et al., 1995); 
 difficulties in defining appropriate measures of service quality rather than simply 
focusing on “activities” or outputs (Ryan and Brown, 1998); and 
 the difficulty in applying a cost/benefit analysis in a public sector context (Seddon 
and MacPherson, 2000). 
Relational contracting theory (MacNeil, 1980; Williamson, 1985) emphasises the merits of 
generating a network of trusted agents to lower transaction costs in “incomplete contracts”; 
that is where contracts are for the delivery of services that are hard to quantify and assess, 
such as in community services (Milward and Provan, 2000). Recent developments in public 
management literature (Bertelli and Smith, 2010) highlight that where agency capacity to 
supply specialised services is limited or volatile, if the government department does not retain 
the responsibility for delivery it must put in place a strong relational basis for the contract. 
Where outputs are complex, traditional command-and-control approaches to accountability 
are difficult and costly to maintain so it makes sense to emphasise trust rather than formal 
arms-length tendering. While all business relationships rely on a degree of trust, that degree is 
greater in situations of complexity typical of human services. In such situations, managers 
emphasise flexibility as a response to the complexity, on the basis that motivation to renege 
on contract in the short run is overpowered by potential future gains. 
Services for perpetrators of domestic violence epitomise situations where incomplete 
contractual information, the perceived merits of community-based service delivery, and a 
limited range of service suppliers combine to highlight the importance of the relationship 
between the funder and the providers of the services. We will argue below, however, that 
relational contracting practices in the situations under investigation did not improve contract 
management, and indeed, what we have identified as distant relations contributed to poor 
monitoring and assessment of programme processes and output. 
Contracting out domestic violence perpetrator programmes 
In Australia, and other countries, the earliest specialist services responding to domestic 
violence were those which were developed to support women and their children escaping 
domestic violence. Such programmes, centring on the provision of emergency 
accommodation, remain the first line of specialist response. In the 1980s there was concern 
that, in addition to legal remedies, there should be direct work undertaken with men using 
violence against their female partners. Scholars and practitioners have been sceptical about 
their effect, which has resulted in calls for their evaluation (Babcock et al., 2004; Feder and 
Wilson, 2005; Laing, 2002). 
Commonly these programmes involve group-delivered interventions for perpetrators that are 
psycho-educational in approach, although a number of different models are employed (Day et 
al., 2009). These include interventions which focus on intra-psychic behaviour change, 
particularly anger management and emotional self regulation, to approaches which place 
more emphasis on the context in which gendered violence occurs and focus on the need for 
multi-agency and co-ordinated service provision. In practice, many contemporary perpetrator 
programmes represent a blend between these two approaches, delivering interventions that 
target individual problem awareness and the development of skills that can improve self-
control and also acknowledge the importance of integrated community responses or multi-
agency working approaches to effective risk management[2]. The best documented and most 
often replicated of these latter models, in Australia at least, is the Duluth model (Shepard and 
Pence, 1999). 
The Duluth model advocates that men's domestic violence perpetrator programmes should 
only be one element of an integrated domestic violence community response, and specifies 
that programme providers should seek contact with women partners/ex-partners as a means of 
ensuring that accounts of abusive behaviour are not reliant solely on perpetrator self-reports. 
Furthermore, it requires processes to be in place for programme providers to have contact 
with the police and other services so that risk management procedures are in place, should 
concerns for women's and children's safety arise. Thus the approach is an integrated response 
whereby information is shared, agencies have an agreed understanding of domestic violence, 
joint protocols for action are agreed, and the role of each of the agencies in stopping domestic 
violence and promoting safety is clearly articulated and understood. 
The Department of Corrections funds the programmes for legally mandated perpetrators but 
these are delivered by agencies that often also deliver programmes for non-mandated 
participants. One complication for the contracting out process in domestic violence services 
is that for some time there has been a national shortage of professionals available to run 
domestic violence perpetrator programmes in Australia. Whilst this absence of workers is not 
a consequence of the contracting process, it can lead to situations where programmes are 
disrupted and discontinuous. This is not unique to domestic violence perpetrator programme 
delivery as various areas of community services where professionals are dealing directly with 
complex situations of violence and abuse, such as child safety, have difficulty recruiting, 
retaining and experienced staff (Healy et al., 2009). When workers are scarce and often 
change, however, this increases the case for strong explicit contracts, oversight and clear 
programme standards. 
In the area of contracting for domestic violence perpetrator programmes, however, the nature 
of the service delivery, and the limited availability of trained staff and supervisors, makes 
such a case difficult to satisfy. 
The agencies and programmes being evaluated 
The public servants in the contracting department were aiming to fund perpetrator 
programmes that were part of a local community integrated domestic violence response, as 
had been identified nationally as good practice (Chung et al., 2003). In line with the 
commissioning requirements of the State, all agencies indicated that they were part of a local 
integrated response and could offer female partner contact and referral to support and other 
services as required by female partners/ex-partners. Beyond that stipulation of community 
integration, the department was aware that it was purchasing programmes based on different 
rationales and approaches. As work in the area of programmes for domestic violence 
perpetrators is still relatively new, this variation was viewed as a helpful means of assessing 
whether a particular approach would produce better outcomes. 
In the situation under investigation, four NGOs, based in four different locations, (two 
metropolitan and two regional), were contracted by the Department of Corrections to deliver 
domestic violence perpetrator programmes. Each of the organisations had considerable 
experience in providing various types of contracted human services such as counselling, 
employment and family support programmes, as well as a history of running domestic 
violence perpetrator programmes and support services for female victims of domestic 
violence. All of the agencies were members of large national not-for-profit organisations, 
three of which had religious affiliations. 
At two of the agencies (agencies A and B), a locally developed programme model was used, 
which incorporated some programme content elements that were drawn from the Duluth 
programme (emphasising perpetrator accountability for actions, measured through techniques 
such as the use of a “power and control wheel”), but were not fully identified or promoted as 
Duluth programmes. By contrast, agencies C and D presented their programme as based on 
the complete Duluth model (Table I). 
The contracts used for all of the organisations were the same, with variations only in terms of 
the annual number of groups to be delivered, or the number of participants who were 
expected to attend. This meant that the total funds for an organisation delivering programmes 
in a large urban area were greater than for those working in a small rural community with 
considerably less population. 
A key point is that contracts were written in terms of agency activity, not output and 
outcomes. With respect to perpetrator group programs, the contract reporting requirements 
specified the time and length of the group programmes typically measured by their hours of 
attendance at weekly group sessions typically run over 18 to 24 week period and the level of 
required throughput of perpetrators. All of this was reported in a simple template, and thus it 
was easy for the agencies to acquit in strict accordance with the wording of the contract, 
without needing to assess participant behaviour change. As for the victim protection 
component of the contract, it was not specific about what was required and only specified the 
hours to be allocated to victim contact. Agencies were not required to report on this activity 
in detail although the agencies felt that they were doing what was possible within the 
resources that were available. It was not apparent from their routine reporting to the 
Department that they had breached the specification of the contract even though we were 
concerned that this was the case. 
Note that this research team was not contracted to evaluate the programmes, per se, on behalf 
of the funding department. Our research was expected to reflect on the relative merits of 
differing models of service delivery rather than assess whether contract specifications about 
output and outcome were being met by each agency. Nevertheless, we did advise the 
Department that, in our opinion, the poor victim contact practices constituted a breach of 
contract. While this was accepted by the Department and led to discussion of an overhaul of 
contracting practices, at the time of writing we were not aware that this had taken place. 
The programme design for the research reported here included an assessment of the relative 
importance of first, the declared programme design and second, the location of the service, 
for programme outcomes including victim safety. 
Evaluation methodology 
Building on previous large-scale evaluation research on domestic violence perpetrator 
programmes (Gondolf, 2002) our study design examined the programme design and content 
as well as documenting participant throughput. Gondolf (2002) argued that based on his 
research findings, the programme content was not the most critical variable in effectiveness 
but rather it was the local agencies integrated responses that mattered in responding to men's 
use of violence. Therefore our evaluation design emphasised examining the programmes and 
how the service providers worked within a local community response. The evaluation aims 
were therefore to compare the use of two different perpetrator programmes models to identify 
whether one is more effective and under what circumstances, and identify social/structural 
factors and organisational factors across the four locations that contribute to programme 
effectiveness or impede effectiveness. 
The evaluation design was a realist evaluation (Pawson, 2006; Pawson and Tilley, 1997) that 
combined three strands of data collection: 
1. programme level data on individual men's participation and progress through a 
domestic violence perpetrator programme; 
2. women partners' safety and access to support services; and 
3. information about the extent to which agencies worked as part of a local integrated 
response. 
Data were collected via: pre-and post survey questionnaires completed by participants of the 
programme; semi-structured interviews with partners of the men in the programme; and semi-
structured interviews with managers and workers from the contracted agencies, the 
commissioning department, and partner agencies that the contracted agencies were expected 
to link with in their respective locations. Secondary data collected included an analysis of 
State policy documents, agency documents including domestic violence policies, as well as 
programme documentation and agency data collected through the contract monitoring 
process. The interviews were repeated over a three-year period, and covered issues of 
programme logic, challenges to programme implementation and strengths of current 
practices. 
For the analysis of programme effectiveness, a battery of self-report measures including 
measures of abusive behaviour and attitudes, alcohol dependency, treatment readiness, and 
trait anger was administered to participants before and after the programme. Descriptive 
statistics were produced, and a series of related sample t-tests were used to examine the 
changes in participants on the measures between the start of the program and after completing 
the program. 
The analysis of programme delivery including inter-agency collaboration and victim outreach 
was based on scrutiny of the comprehensive program manuals produced by each agency, 
including the theoretical framework purported to underpin the program, compared and 
contrasted with the data collected in the interviews as described above. The principle of 
saturation determined when sufficient data were been collected in relation to each issue 
(Denzin and Lincoln, 2005). Interviews were transcribed and entered into Nvivo for 
qualitative management and coding (Richards, 1999) although, beyond assignment of nodes 
for key conceptual variables, much of the subsequent analysis was manual. Analysis of data 
was informed by interpretivist traditions, using constant comparison to identify themes and 
issues associated with key research foci, such as perceptions of the role of victim outreach 
and need for integration with women's shelters and child protection agencies These themes 
were identified and sorted inductively, using constant comparison techniques to analyse 
differences within and between the themes emergent within and between the agency 
responses. 
It was evident, that there was wide variation in programme delivery across sites and this 
largely seemed attributable to differences in contract interpretation and organisational 
cultures, rather than different models of programme practice which is what we had 
anticipated. Therefore in this paper we focus on examining the ways in which the 
commissioning process and organisational factors in the four locations influenced service 
delivery arrangements. In particular, in the following sections we address, first, out findings 
on organisation arrangements resulting from decisions by departmental managers about how 
they implemented and monitored the contracts and, second, the practices of programme 
facilitators in the agencies that shaped the relationship between the perpetrator programmes 
and the agency links with the police, other domestic violence providers and the victims. 
Findings 
Intra-organisational factors 
The ways in which agencies ran and organised the contracted programme delivery in question 
was not standardised across sites. A notable difference in organisational arrangements was in 
terms of how much the programme was related to the agency's core business and how the 
contracted programmes related to each agency's suite of programmes. Agencies A and C and 
to a lesser extent B added the funding from the contract to funds derived from other sources, 
to either provide additional services or to include State referred (and legally mandated) male 
participants in existing group programmes run for non-mandated participants. The men 
referred to the contracted service therefore received the same programme as these agencies 
provided to all their male service users. For the purposes of this analysis, however, a critical 
arrangement was that these three agencies employed workers as programme facilitators on a 
full or a continuing part time basis, and all or some of their work involved running 
perpetrator programmes. As facilitators were staff members they participated in supervision, 
training, performance reviews and other agency requirements. 
In contrast, agency D treated the contracted funding from the State as a completely separate 
item, to the point where programme facilitators were paid on a sessional basis, only related to 
the actual delivery of the men's group programmes plus some hours of preparation. In these 
cases the workers had minimal ongoing supervision and were not part of regular staff 
meetings or general organisational communications. Their opportunities for staff 
development and performance review were limited. 
Our observation here is that the short term contract culture which emerged in agency D as a 
direct result of that agency's response to contracting-out, epitomises the concern of critics 
about the potential of contractualism for reduced capacity building in the community services 
workforce (Healy, 2004; Meagher and Healy, 2003; Wagner and Spence, 2003). Moreover, 
not only does sessional work and minimal supervision run the risk of limited capacity 
building, but also of high staff turnover in an area that is already experiencing strain, all of 
which can lead to programme disruption and suspension at times. 
It could be argued that whilst agency D was a not-for-profit agency, its approach more 
closely reflected that of a for profit organisation, emphasising cost and efficiency 
considerations more than the other agencies, which emphasised a commitment to service 
delivery in areas where the private market would not operate. Beyond funding deployment 
within the agencies, however, there was notable variation in service delivery that was partly 
related to employment arrangements for the workforce. 
Government departments throughout Australia have produced domestic violence policies that 
include standards of practice for working with male perpetrators of domestic violence (Chung 
et al., 2003). Some important aspects of those government-stipulated standards of practice 
include male and female workers jointly facilitating group programmes, a form of women's 
safety contact being undertaken to follow up with female partners/ex-partners, and 
expectations about reporting men who breached attendance requirements to the State 
authorities. The ways in which agencies ran and organised the contracted programme 
delivery in question was not standardised across sites and from our observations, the agencies 
were only meeting some of these standards in their practice. In relation to the requirement for 
male and female facilitators, for example, agency A always ran programmes with male and 
female facilitators, whereas agency B subscribed to the same principles as agency A, but in 
practice its location in a regional town contributed to decisions to often run small sessions 
with one facilitator, including individual counselling sessions. As anticipated, worker 
shortage was evident in this situation, where programmes had to be suspended at times as no 
workers were available. 
Both agencies A and B exhibited minimal commitment to contacting female partners/ex-
partners. By contrast, agency C was alone in assiduously pursuing the outreach and safety 
monitoring of women victims despite the fact that its contract with the department entailed 
the same level of funding as the other three agencies and the same (minimal) reporting 
requirements by the department about men's attendance at the programmes. This might have 
conceivably been associated with the regional location of agency C but more specifically it 
could be attributed to the organisational and worker commitment to maintaining standards of 
practice in domestic violence. 
A direct consequence of the minimal attempt to contact female partners in agencies A and B 
was the reliance on men's self reporting of their behaviour. Relying solely on men's self 
reporting of their behaviour in domestic violence programmes is considered notoriously poor 
practice (Chung and O'Leary, 2009). This highlighted variation in the standards of practice 
between agencies and offers an example of a lack of attention to appropriate risk management 
strategies by programme facilitators and agencies. 
Inter-organisational factors – working in the local community 
Differences in how programmes are delivered are not intrinsically a problem if programmes 
are delivering similar outcomes. However, good practice standards recommend that any 
response is strongly embedded in the broader responses to domestic violence. A critical factor 
in our evaluation was how the agency's practice model determined its place in a local 
response to domestic violence. 
Where agencies viewed themselves as key partners in a local domestic violence response, the 
additional delivery of a contracted male perpetrator programme was viewed as extending 
their agency mandate to stop domestic violence in the community within an integrated 
response system. Some (agencies A, B and C), regardless of location, viewed their agency as 
one member in a “network” or “integrated” response to domestic violence in their local 
community, and held that this contracted service was one aspect of a partnership. The 
agencies, therefore, had links with the police, other domestic violence providers and so on, so 
that if men or women needed support the agency could refer them to other services. There 
were often already-established staff relationships and networks, to which the contracted 
programme was added. 
In contrast, another large agency with responsibility for programme delivery across multiple 
metropolitan sites (agency D, which we have already identified as holding its funding for this 
programme separate from other funds), interpreted its relationship with the department as 
essentially that of a principal/agent partnership (Stoker, 1998). It focused only on delivering 
the perpetrator group programme element despite the contract clearly stipulating a component 
of victim contact/outreach as a key component of service delivery. Unlike the other agencies 
studied here, agency D also showed less commitment to being a key partner in the local 
community domestic violence integrated system. It presented itself as more of a standalone 
“programme for hire” with no responsibility for linking into any integrated response. Where 
there was contact with women partners who required support this led to intra-organisational 
referrals (between departments in the agency or occasionally between agency branches in 
different locations) for women's support. In essence, the notion of an integrated response in 
this instance was operationalised in terms of intra-organisational referrals rather than through 
a community based partnership strategy. This approach was, of course, in part the result of 
the sessional facilitator employment practices of this agency which did not enable the men's 
programme facilitators to become part of a local community-based response. 
Finally, all of the agencies were responsible for reporting to the State on male participants 
who breached attendance requirements and it was then local departmental corrective services 
that had the responsibility of addressing these breaches. It was, therefore, also concerning that 
at two sites, one metropolitan and one regional, the local department service was not a 
member of the regular meetings of the agencies that were held to coordinate service delivery 
for domestic violence victims in those areas. The participants included representatives of 
women's shelters and family and community/child protection support workers as 
recommended by the Duluth model held to underpin much of the service delivery. It also 
adds further to the lack of a coherent integrated response within the department, and 
importantly for outcomes, it contributes to inconsistencies across service delivery sites. 
Contractualism and quality assurance: the need for workforce development in 
contracted agencies and hollowed-out government departments 
A dilemma in this situation was that the familiarity of the department staff with staff in the 
chosen agencies at the time of offering the contracts led to an insufficient amount of detailed 
contractual negotiations and subsequent contract management and accountability, rather than 
too much, as is more commonly reported in the literature. This poor monitoring was then 
exacerbated by subsequent staff turnover in both the government department and the 
contracted organisations, without adequate succession planning or handover. Since the 
commencement of contracts, staff changes in both the department and the agencies meant that 
an initial underlying commitment to workforce development, trust and good-will were made 
increasingly irrelevant. This is common in the human services in Australia, and in this 
situation it was particularly problematic for practice. Distant relations are fine to invite to a 
birthday party but not as the premise for effective contracting of human service programmes! 
Although it is not an issue commonly discussed in the literature about service delivery, 
quality assurance, we suggest is important for commissioning departments to give increased 
attention to the implications for human resources within the department, the administrative 
burden of the resulting implementation strategies and the demands of the ongoing 
management of programmes. 
The practices of the commissioned agencies in question varied in accordance with 
organisational culture as much as the distinctiveness of the model deemed to underpin each 
programme or the location of the agency. In terms of the effect on direct practice the 
evaluation showed that the pre-existing organisational cultures and practices for managing 
contracts directly impacted on the quality of services provided. 
Attempts to identify the implications of different programme models in operation were 
confounded by the fact that, at an organisational level, agencies had differing arrangements 
and standards about who was recruited to conduct the programmes. Notwithstanding 
published standards of practice for domestic violence programmes, a range of professionals 
from differing disciplinary backgrounds were involved in the work and brought differing 
approaches to practice. In addition to variable employment practices, the level of experience, 
training and supervision varied considerably across agencies, adding further to the variation 
in programme practice. Those agencies that employed people on a longer term and permanent 
basis tended to have experience in domestic violence and exposed the workers to new 
training and developments as permanent members of staff. By contrast, those who were 
employed on casual contracts in some cases did have experience in working in domestic 
violence but this was not universal and opportunities for further development or even 
participation in case reviews or case conferences were not made evident during interviews 
with managers. 
The variation that related to both organisational cultures and service delivery models raises 
questions about the discretion of agency managers responsible for the implementation of the 
contracts and individual practitioners working in these situations and, in particular, their 
interpretations of (organisational) policy and what constitutes good practice in domestic 
violence service delivery. This observation resonates with Lipsky's (1981) seminal analysis 
of “street-level bureaucrats”, even though in this case the street level bureaucrats were 
employees of non-government welfare agencies responsible for the implementation of State 
policy through their contracted organisation/employer. Evans' (2010) recent work 
highlighting the role of discretion amongst managers in welfare was starkly evident from the 
data we collected, highlighting wide variation in contract interpretation and consequently 
practice standards in programmes. 
At the micro level of professional practice it is evident that there is professional discretion 
which practitioners have in their approach to their work (Evans and Harris, 2004; Evans, 
2010). In running programmes for domestic violence perpetrators, there are choices that each 
practitioner makes between confronting, persuading, cajoling, and motivating clients towards 
some form of agreement with the basic goal of non-violence. The standards of practice which 
different workers may in reality adhere to also highlight the place of discretion. In this 
evaluation, some practitioners in agencies did not adhere to standards of practice associated 
with female partner contact, some would consider this discretion, and others would view it as 
poor practice. Discretion is often restricted or bounded by the agency's standard of practice 
and these aspects of practice will be influenced by all of the above mentioned factors, as well 
as the discretion of the facilitators running the programme. Discretion is neither good nor 
bad, but in the case of domestic violence perpetrator programmes the issue of victim safety is 
paramount and some contact with victims should not be optional. 
All of these intra-organisational factors, compounded by the discretion of managers and 
practitioners, demonstrate why variations occur between agencies with same mandates and 
responsibilities, and why the commissioning process will not necessarily produce similar 
practices and outcomes in implementation. In a context of limited quality assurance and 
monitoring by the agencies and the commissioning department, this can pose problems for 
people's safety. We have highlighted the issues that are typically emphasised in 
“implementation gap” and “street-level bureaucrat” analyses, but we have been at pains to 
emphasise the importance of capacity to monitor these issues by the commissioning 
department as being critical for any relationship between the department and the contracted 
agencies. 
In terms of contract monitoring, these emerging variations in agencies' programmes were not 
identified either by the routine data collection processes (which were part of the contract 
requirements), or by monitoring of the agencies by the commissioning department. Careful 
monitoring and quality assurance did not seem to have occurred in the situations being 
investigated here, best characterised as distant relations. There was little expectation that 
agencies' practices would change at either the managerial or service delivery levels. Rather 
agencies signed the contracts and began provision of programmes with limited advice, 
interference or monitoring from the state. All of these aspects can cumulatively compromise 
the programme goal of promoting victim safety. However, as the contracts and the 
contracting out process did not involve sufficiently rigorous documenting of programme 
elements to be delivered, nor of programme outputs, there was considerable discretion for the 
agencies to implement the programmes. This meant that at a later stage insufficient evidence 
that the department could use to make a confident assessment of how the programme was 
promoting the safety of victims. 
Given the current limited numbers of agencies available as potential contractors to deliver 
domestic violence services, and the lack of workers available to run the perpetrator 
programmes, the State was left at the mercy of the human services market, especially in rural 
areas, where the State had to purchase what was available. But we conclude that, despite the 
literature asserting that relational contracting is the most suitable mechanism for such 
situations as these, where services that are hard to quantify and assess or agency capacity to 
supply specialised services is limited, what was needed in this situation was greater 
specificity in the contract, as well as more carefully monitored implementation, to assure the 
safety of victims of violence. 
Public servants in the commissioning departments, with limited experience in writing 
contracts, continue to be part of the teams responsible for the preparation of tenders and 
contracts in the human services. In the present study, there was strong evidence of a need for 
the commissioning department to develop performance agreements that have more clarity and 
precision about what constitutes contract compliance, the consequences of non-compliance 
and the scope and mechanisms for review or renegotiation of contract conditions. This is not 
an indictment of the applicability of relational contracting theory in all cases, but it is an 
illustration of how the level of complexity of the programme/intervention being contracted is 
critical (not uncommon in human services) and the limitations of relationship building in the 
situation of depleted resources in government departments. Where this is the case, it points to 
a need to question the fashion for contracting-out as a cheap alternative to capacity 
development in the government departments. 
When distant relations undermine relational contracting and limit quality assurance 
A key to the various arrangements for service delivery observed in this study was whether the 
funded programme had been incorporated into the agency's core business or treated as a 
relatively discrete service delivery arrangement. A critical fact for an assessment of 
contractualism was the extent to which the agencies continued to operate in relatively 
autonomous ways. This was diametrically opposed to much of the critique of contracting out 
as being overly restrictive because of onerous reporting and accountability requirements. 
In this case, incomplete contracting was not well managed by relational contracting, contrary 
to suggestions in the literature. Allowing agency discretion (by default), and the associated 
worker variability in service delivery, generated practices that raise concerns about 
compromising the quality of the service. In the particular case of domestic violence 
perpetrator programmes under investigation here, this is not just an issue of a policy 
implementation gap or professional discretion, but, most importantly a safety issue, where the 
knowledge of safety of victims and their children should not be left to worker or agency 
discretion. 
Detailed contracts and contract monitoring can contribute to public accountability, but many 
authors in the literature express concern that it should not stifle innovation and appropriate 
use of discretion. However, the commissioning of relatively complex forms of service 
delivery to meet standards of practice which promote women's and children's safety cannot be 
easily addressed by only these relational commissioning activities in the absence of capacity 
development in the commissioning departments. A prerequisite is that commissioning 
managers need to be knowledgeable and well informed about the types of services they are 
commissioning in order that agencies contracted have appropriate staffing levels and 
qualifications to try and ensure programme standards and outcomes for service delivery are 
met. 
Relational contracting practices did not help solve this problem, and indeed, we argue that 
they exacerbated it. In cases such as those investigated here where government department 
resources have been depleted, the preference for contracting community service agencies to 
deliver services continues highlights the need for greater specificity and monitoring in the 
contract arrangements, to potentially increase consistency and impose more precise standards 
of practice than were in evidence. 
At a time where the significance of evidence based practice is understandably being 
emphasised, contracted out programmes pose a challenge to the development of such 
knowledge, as the contracted organisations will not be funded or necessarily see it as their 
role to open their programmes to the scrutiny of researchers. Thus community services 
generally, and domestic violence perpetrator programmes in particular, will struggle to 
develop a large scale and sound evidence base. In the particular case of domestic violence 
perpetrator programmes under investigation here, this is not just an issue of a policy 
implementation gap but, most importantly a safety issue, where the knowledge of safety of 
victims and their children is patchy at best and unknown at worst. 
 
Table IService delivery context of agencies 
Notes 
1. Usually not-for-profit agencies. 
2. The terms integrated community responses and multi-agency working have both been 
used here as they represent how these ways of working have been phrased differently 
in different countries. 
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